Current tendencies and problems.--Bosanquet on the artist's medium.--Bergson's penal theory of comedy.--The one and the many in Croce's aesthetic.--Santayana's doctrine of aesthetic expression.--Beauty and relativity: the theory of Charles Lalo.--Remarks on the ugly.

This paper reimagines the traditional problem of other minds. On a Cartesian view, the problem involves humans’ inability to perceive other persons’ minds. Similarly, Gilbert Ryle claims that we cannot directly access another’s mind. The paper’s rethinking of the problem of other minds moves beyond these questions of perceptibility and accessibility. It asks whether there are certain groups of people whose minds are systematically misinterpreted, or even denied mentality. It argues that there are. This claim builds off recent work (...) in philosophy and social psychology on epistemic injustice and the role of social categories in mental state attribution. The paper proposes the Problem of the Other’s Mind: the phenomenon of a (relatively) socially privileged person’s inability or lack of desire to understand the mind of a (relatively) socially underprivileged person. (shrink)

Between the appearance of Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus in 1543 and the works of Kepler and Galileo that appeared in 1609–10, there were probably no more than a dozen converts to physical heliocentrism. Following Westman we take this list to include Rheticus, Maestlin, Rothmann, Kepler, Bruno, Galileo, Digges, Harriot, de Zúńiga, and Stevin, but we include Gemma Frisius and William Gilbert, and omit Thomas Harriot. In this paper we discuss the reasons this tiny group of true Copernicans give for believing (...) that Copernicus, not Ptolemy or Tycho Brahe, was correct. We conclude that the early followers of Copernicus can be divided into two main groups, designated mathematicians and physicists. Two main arguments appear in the works of the former: first, the relationship between the velocity of a planet and its distance from the center of the world; second, the explanation of retrogradations. Early Copernicans differed on the reality of celestial spheres, and several attempted to reconcile heliocentrism with scripture. The mathematicians continued to accept a traditional definition of the scope of astronomy and the methods of science, both issues challenged by Kepler and Galileo. Hence the work of Copernicus set in motion a train of events that led to a decisive epistemological shift, but did not itself represent such a shift. The real revolution is the replacement of the methods and goals of Ptolemaic astronomy and Aristotelian physics with Copernicanism in its modern form, which incorporates the conceptual structure of Kepler and the astronomical evidence of Galileo. (shrink)

How do things persist? Are material objects spread out through time just as they are spread out through space? Or is temporal persistence quite different from spatial extension? This key question lies at the heart of any metaphysical exploration of the material world, and it plays a crucial part in debates about personal identity and survival. This book explores and compares three theories of persistence — endurance, perdurance, and stage theories — investigating the ways in which they attempt to account (...) for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, the book concludes by advocating stage theory. Such a basic issue about the nature of the physical world naturally has close ties with other central philosophical problems. This book includes discussions of change and parthood, of how we refer to material objects at different times, of the doctrine of Humean supervenience, and of the modal features of material things. In particular, it contains new accounts of the nature of worldly vagueness, and of what binds material things together over time, distinguishing the career of a natural object from an arbitrary sequence of events. Each chapter concludes with a reflection about the impact of these metaphysical debates upon questions about our personal identity and survival. (shrink)